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FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF NON-FERROUS METALLURGY IN 1947

Prepared By

Documents Branch

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

New War Department Building
21st and Virginia Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

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D O C U M E N T S B R A N C H

T R A N S L A T I O N

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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

Fundamental Problems of Non-ferrous Metallurgy in 1947

This is a translation of an article appearing in the Jan-Feb 1947 issue of the periodical, Non-ferrous Metals, published by the Ministry of Non-ferrous Metallurgy of the USSR. It is devoted to an explanation of the 1947 program for non-ferrous metallurgy, setting forth the production aims and tasks to be accomplished under the new Five-Year Plan. The article discusses in some detail such problems as: lowering production costs, increasing labor productivity, improving working conditions, and fully exploiting the capabilities of workers and technicians. Furthermore, it lists some of the non-ferrous metal enterprises which fulfilled their 1946 quotas as well as some of those which failed to meet their quotas.

Pages 1 through 12

FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF NON-FERROUS METALLURGY IN 1947

I. V. Arkhipov, Vice-Minister,
Non-ferrous Metallurgy of the USSR

During 1946, non-ferrous metallurgy workers, together with the entire Soviet population, worked successfully for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the production program for the first year of Stalin's new Five-Year Plan.

The 1946 program was completed ahead of schedule by such large non-ferrous metallurgical enterprises as the Kounrad smelter, the Tyrnyauz and Zhidin tungsten-molybdenum combines, the Khaydarkan mercury and combine, and the Moscow heavy alloy combine. The 1946 black copper program was fulfilled by all the plants in the Urals. The Ural Aluminum Plant systematically overfulfilled the quarterly plan for aluminum. All the plants of the Second Main Administration of Non-ferrous Metal lurgy, the Khingan, Onon, Narym smelters of the Main Tin Administration, and many other enterprises produced more than was planned for 1946.

The year's production quota for tin was fulfilled by 99 percent. Production, as compared with 1945, increased in nearly all basic metals: copper, lead, zinc, cadmium, secondary aluminum, nickel, tin, tungsten concentrate, and antimony.

Not all enterprises, however, were able to cope with the tasks assigned them. The Krasnoural', Karabash, and especially the Degtyar)former director, Comrade Malkin) smelters worked poorly in 1946. In spite of improved materiel-technical security, these enterprises did not take the necessary measures for proper organization of work and for precautions against underground fires; as a result, the quota for ore extraction was not only below that expected, but the quantity of extracted ore was lower than in 1945.

The Pyshmin copper electrolyte factory finished 1946 unsatisfactorily. Even though its output of refined copper was above that produced in 1945, it did not fulfill its assigned quota.

The Mednogorsk copper sulfide plant also failed to meet its quota for the output of element sulphur and black copper.

Furthermore, the Moscow copper smelting and copper electrolyte plant imeni Molotov did not fulfill its 1946 quota. The extremely neglected condition of the equipment caused frequent accidents as well as inadmissable and continued work stoppages in the construction of anode furnaces and casting machines.

In the lead-zinc industry we must note the production lag of the Sikhote-Alin combine, the Zyryanov Smelter, and especially the Chimkent lead plant. The production of this /latter/ plant deteriorated sharply at the end of 1946 in

spite of the increased supply of raw materials.

In the tungsten-molybdenum industry, the production of molydenum concentrates by the Shakhtomin and Davendin plants was unsatisfactory in both quantity and quality.

The production lag of these enterprises cannot be explained in terms of the objective difficulties of the postwar period and the complexities of material-technical supply. The main reason is to be found in the low level of economic leadership and in the incompetence of the present leaders of these enterprises in mobilizing, according to Bol'shevik traditions, the creative energies of the workers and engineer-technicians for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of government tasks.

During 1946, in accordance with the tasks set forth in the new Five-Year Plan, the authorities of a number of active enterprises were extended and new powers were effected.

1. The reconstruction of the Volkhov plant, the oldest in the Soviet aluminum industry, was completed first; on 28 Sep 1946 the plant produced its first metal.

2. In the North Ural bauxite mines, four shafts were constructed or are under construction.

3. New electrode plants are being exploited for the output of high-grade products.

4. The second series of electrolyte baths were reconstructed in the Severonikel combine; the nickel metallurgical plant of the Pechenganikel combine was put into action first and the Kaula mine completely reconstructed.

5. A new series of electrolyte baths were introduced into the Pyshmin copper electrode plant.

6. A new refining plant was constructed and put into operation in the Akuatau tungsten fields.

During the past year non-ferrous metallurgy completed only the first steps in the realization of tasks set forth in the new Five-Year Plan. There should be thorough industrial improvement in non-ferrous mining enterprises in 1947, especially in the Ural copper mines and in the lead-zinc mines.

Generally, the extraction of copper ore increased in 1946 as compared with 1945. However, extraction can be significantly greater, especially in the case of the Ural copper ore industry which did not operate effectively in 1946.

The production lag of raw material bases in leading industries is noted in the law of the new Five-Year Plan.

However, in 1946 much more has been done toward the liquidation of this situation.

It is well to bear in mind that the mine is the fundamental limiting link in production of non-ferrous metals only by means of increasing extraction is it possible to guarantee a higher level in production.

The production lag in some of our mining enterprises (Degtyar, East Kounrad mines) is absolutely inadmissable. The elimination of this condition will assure an increased ore supply. The creation of sufficient stores of ore and the guaranteeing of improved labor conditions should be the prime concern of the directors and engineer-technicians of non-ferrous mining enterprises.

In 1947 it will be necessary to increase the tempo of mine excavating enterprises, putting to use the experience of our leading enterprises. The past year was marked by the development of high-speed excavation methods. The adoption of high-speed excavation methods made it possible for the miners of the North Ural bauxite mines to obtain regular monthly extractions of 140-160 loading cars instead of the usual 25-30 loading cars.

In Aug 1946 the brigades of Comrades Minzaripov and Pronichkin made a pledge to the 29th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution to excavate a drift under complex mining conditions and to reunite the mines which were being exploited. On 5 Nov 1946 the brigades completed the joining of the mines, having raised the usual rate of excavation five times.

What conditioned the success of these high-speed excavators who employed the very same drills and loading cars elsewhere? In this instance it was not a question of special equipment, but of the high level of economic and technical leadership. The director of the North Ural bauxite mines, Comrade Bogatov, Chief Engineer Nifontov, and many engineer-technicians did much to help the workers and to mobilize the reserves on hand.

The example of the North Ural bauxite mines demonstrates once more that, given equal supply and equal technical equipment, the success of the operation is decided by the personnel, i.e., the workers, engineers, organizers and production heads. From this, it is clear that widespread dissemination of high-speed excavation experience among miners of non-ferrous metals is necessary.

High-speed excavation of mines is to be organized in 1947 in the Dzhezkazgane and East Kounrad enterprises, the Main Ural Copper Administration and Main Zinc-Lead Administration enterprises, and other enterprises in the Ministry. The most advanced mechanization will be practiced in our mining enterprises in 1947. This will include wide use of

(1) telescope and column drills instead of hand-boring carriages using three or four drills in horizontal excavating; and (2) electric cars and conveyors for hauling ore and raising rock. The full and rational exploitation of equipment already on hand as well as newly appearing equipment is the duty of every miner.

It is inadmissible that in the Main Ural' Copper Administration enterprises the percentage of drills in use was not higher than in 1945, although their number was noticeably increased.

Special attention must also be given to increasing the effectiveness of blasting by the use of the best explosives during perforator drilling in 1947.

Much importance is attached to the tasks placed before the geologists of non-ferrous metallurgy. In 1947 geologists must not only make ready industrial stores of ore in order to build up new enterprises but must also uncover new stores necessary for lengthening the period of exploitation of enterprises not in operation. The allotment of the general expenditures for geological exploration for research work will be raised to 28 percent in 1947, as compared with 14 percent in 1946.

According to the 1947 program, the growth of industrial stores should increase the extraction of lead 3.4 times, of bauxite 3.5 times, of copper more than 2 times, and of tin 2.8 times. Special attention should be given to regulating the work of refineries.

The quality of the work of many refineries has dropped during the past few years as compared with the prewar period. For example, in the Krasnoural' refinery, extraction of copper from copper concentrates was 88 percent in 1940, but 80.2 percent after ten months of 1946. In the Kirovgrad plant, it was 88.6 percent before the war, and 84.7 percent after ten months of 1946. Extraction of zinc from zinc concentrate in the Main Zinc-Lead Administration refineries dropped particularly sharply in 1946. At the Leninogorsk plant, it was 77.0 percent in 1940, and 67.5 percent in ten months of 1946.

Refineries should devote serious attention to the condition of technological discipline within the plants. The existence of proved plans and instructions for technological production and strict observance of them is the basis of a stable and effective technological process.

Production figures for 1946 and preceeding years show that certain refineries, to a large extent, limit the work of metallurgical plants which do not deal with processing the ore. This refers especially to the refineries of the raw materials base of the Chimkent lead plant. For example, the Khantagin refinery was idle 28 percent of calendar time

in 1946, including 17.7 percent for repairs and damage to equipment; the Baydzhansay refinery was idle considerably more than it worked. It is imperative to improve the organization of repairs to equipment in refineries and metallurgical plants and to organize thorough daily care of equipment, instead of neglecting it until damaged.

One of the most important problems for the refineries is to increase, as far as possible, the extraction of primary and secondary components from ores by improving the system of refining, automatizing the control of technological processes, and improving the quality of flotation reagents.

In particular it is necessary to increase the extraction of zinc from zinc-copper ore from the Urals and the output of zinc concentrates at the Krasnoural' refinery.

At the Leninogorsk and Belousov refineries, the refining of lead-copper ore must by mastered in 1047; at the Achisay and Tekeliy plants the use of pyrite flotation is expected.

The installation of Denver ore jiggers and sluices to make possible the increased extraction of gold at the Leninogorsk and Zyryanov refineries is planned in 1947.

Sullivan-type automatic dump sluices should be installed in Khapcherangin and Sinanchin plants of the Main Tin Administration in 1947. This would permit not only a two to three percent increase in the extraction of metals, but also the doubled or tripled economy of labor involved in ore washing.

In 1947 metallurgists should achieve increased extraction of metals, intensification of production processes, and improved use of agglomeration machines, air furnaces, waterjackets, converters, and other aggregate power.

The production of metals of highest purity (aluminum, nickel, and zinc), necessary for new technical development, must be organized in 1947. Specially designated rare metals, production of which must be significantly increased in 1947, are of the greatest importance in Soviet production.

The Five-Year Plan for restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR provides for the utilization of minerals contained in non-ferrous metal ores, including ore sulphides, by means of employing perfected working methods and combining non-ferrous metals with chemical products. Decisive measures for the realization of this task must be undertaken in 1947.

Special attention must be devoted to utilizing accumulated waste products of production---slag from lead plants and the plant imeni Molotov, and reaming and cake from zinc plants.

Within the Ministry as a whole, the production output must be increased by not less than 15 percent in 1947.

Besides this, the growth of production by separate branches of industry---lead-zinc, aluminum-magnesium, nickel-cobalt, and others---must significantly raise the mean level within the Ministry.

In 1947 many serious problems must be resolved by the separate branches of the non-ferrous metals industry. The most important are:

The copper industry. The development of construction in the Dzhezkazgan combine is one of the largest construction jobs for non-ferrous metallurgy in the new five-year plan. The planning of methods for utilizing ores from the Almalyk copper beds, the preparation of the rich Kadzharan beds for exploitation, the guaranteeing of large stores of ore to active enterprises, and the forcing of conclusive work from the Kounrad miners are also to be accomplished.

The lead-zinc industry. Basic emphasis must be given to surmounting production lags in raw materials bases. It is necessary to exploit the Altay's huge wealth and make full use of the power from the exploitation of the new Altai zinc plant.

The aluminum-magnesium industry. One of the most significant problems in the national economy is the mastering of the production of new types of alumina and nephelines and the complex methods of treating them. The Volkhov Aluminum Plant which works with nephelines, will not use up soda, of which there is a deficiency, in the production of alumina. It will, on the contrary, produce soda, potash, and cement itself.

In the Bogoslov and Stalin Aluminum plants and the Bereznikov magnesium plant, construction will be continued, and additional power from thermo-electric center will be used.

Aluminum workers should focus special attention on increasing the output of aluminum of the highest grade.

The nickel-cobalt industry. Restoration of the Severonikel' combine will be continued with full knowledge that the power of new cobalt mills should be made available.

The main problem for workers of the South Urals Nickel combine is the improvement of the quality of nickel produced and the lowering of its copper content.

The tungsten-molybdenum industry. Special attention must be given to enlarging the Tyrnyauz Combine, regulating the molybdenum enterprises in Chita Oblast, increasing the output of tungsten and molybdenum, and improving the quality of concentrates.

The problem of constructing and operating the enterprises of the Maritime and Khabarovsk Krays is to be resolved by the tin industry.

In 1946 the Ministry adopted a series of measures to strengthen the role of technical control offices in the enterprises, to maintain the established order of technological processes, and to regulate the weight and control measure of economy in the enterprises. This work must be continued in 1947.

For non-ferrous metallurgy, as for other branches of our socialist economy, the decisions of the XVIII All-Union Party Congress which call for the daily fulfillment of the program according to both quantitative and qualitative indices remain completely intact.

In past years one of the reasons for work stoppages in non-ferrous metallurgy plants has been the lag in supply of raw materials and the lack of necessary reserves of raw materials in the same plants. Measures were taken in 1946 for building up raw material stores. Enterprises are able to work more steadily and directors of enterprises should take full advantage of this capability.

Questions of production economy are of great significance for non-ferrous metallurgy, just as for other branches of socialist economy. The Party and Government demand of the non-ferrous metallurgy workers the adoption of a regime of economy and thrift, the liquidation of uneconomic and enlarged staffs, the lowering of production costs, and the extreme mobilization of internal resources. The program for lowering production costs was overfulfilled in the second and third quarters of 1946 as a result of measures taken by the Ministry as a whole. However, along with enterprises which are lowering production costs are those which are systematically increasing the expense of the item produced. In 1944 the Degtyar Ore Administration increased the net cost of ore by 13 percent as compared with 1943, in 1945 by 26 percent as compared with 1944, and in ten months of 1946 by 22.1 percent as compared with 1945.

Such increases in cost are absolutely inadmissible in the future. Every enterprise is capable of cutting expenses considerably. Certain non-ferrous metal enterprises skillfully utilized these possibilities and achieved a systematic lowering of production costs. The Severonikel' combine (director, Comrade Nosal') lowered production costs in 1945 by 13.1 percent as compared with 1944, and in eleven months of 1946 succeded in cutting costs 13.8 percent, while the program called for 9.2 percent. The Tyrnyauz tungsten-molybdenum combine (director, Comrade Kulik) lowered production costs 12,6 percent in eleven months of 1946, while the program called for 10 percent.

The methods of lowering the specific costs of ore, fuel, and electricity differ in the various enterprises, but the indispensable common factor is the creative initiative of the production chiefs, engineer-technicians, and the personnel of the enterprise as a whole.

The basic and decisive factor in lowering production costs, especially in mining enterprises, lies in increasing labor productivity.

In refineries and metallurgy plants, the outstandingly important basis for saving lies in reducing the loss of metals and valuable components. The Krasnoural' copper smelter (director, Comrade Zubarev) lowered production costs for 1946 partly because of the best extraction of sulphur contained in the gases which were given off.

One of the chief problems confronting non-ferrous metallurgy in 1947 is increasing labor productivity. During 1946, the production was fulfilled by 100 percent and more. However, these averages conceal the fact that the workers in the leading professions fell short of the norm while those in the subsidiary shops exceeded the norm. In many of the non-ferrous metallurgy enterprises, many of the norms are not technically well-founded. The so-called "experience-statistical" norms, which apply to lagging workers but not to industrious workers, are widely used.

At the Krasnoural' copper smelter, the average percentage of norm fulfillment by piece-workers in Nov 1946 was 112.0 percent, but on the basis of the totql number of piece-workers, workers did not fulfill the production norm. At the Kirovograd copper smelter, the average percentage of norm fulfillment was 100.0 percent, but in that same period about 50 percent of the workers did not fulfill the norm. It is natural that the lowered norms are fulfilled without special work or strain.

It is necessary to put into wider use the principles of the Stakhanovite experiment. The masses of non-ferrous metal workers must be encouraged to increase labor productivity. Depersonalized "arithmetical average" production in which the output of efficient and inefficient workers is mixed should be avoided.

Time-motion studies show that in certain of our enterprises working time is not used effectively enough.

In the South Urals Nickel combine, workers engaged in unloading cargo in the crusher-agglomeration shops lose 30 percent of working time; repair mechanics, 22-23 percent; workers engaged in the preparation of refractory clay in the smelting shops, 63 percent; and electricians, more than 60 percent of working time.

Such facts show that it is quite possible to raise the production level of a single worker by means of arranging the workers properly, and cutting down on the number of workers at separate units.

The greatest possible improvement in material-existence conditions (TN: opposed to cultural-existence conditions) of the workers, engineer-technicians, and laborers is of great

significance in increasing labor productivity. The Party and Government are devoting a great deal of attention to this question. This was reflected in a series of adopted resolutions, in particular in the 25 Aug 1946 decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, "On the Increase in Production Pay and on Measures for the Improvement of Material-existence Conditions for Workers, Engineer-technicians, and Laborers of Enterprises Located in the Urals, Siberia, and in the Far East."

The Government instructions on the amelioration of workers' living conditions have a special significance for workers of the non-ferrous metal industry, inasmuch as our enterprises are distributed, for the most part, in remote and uninhabited regions of the Soviet Union.

In the 1947 program, 20 percent of the total of the Ministry's invested capital is planned for living quarters and cultural-existence construction. It was planned that during this year three times more housing space would be made available than in 1946. Along with mass housing construction, it is planned in 1947 to construct more than three thousand individual houses, including more than two thousand houses for sale to workers.

Last year the directors of the Ural Aluminum Plant set a good example. In spite of the existence there of an orderly construction organization which was carrying on much work in industrial construction, the directors of the plant organized the economical construction of individual homes.

It is necessary also to take measures for the most sanitary working conditions and for the improvement of technical safety in the non-ferrous metal industry. In 1947 the conversion to hydraulic and air drilling in mines with rock containing quartz is planned. This should reduce silicosis and, at the same time, increase the labor productivity of drillers and underground workers.

Much work was carried on in 1946 in instructing and raising the qualifications of workers in the mastering of technical minima, and also in instruction in a second trade. During this year it is imperative to carry this work still further, giving special attention to instruction and to raising the qualifications of workers in leading trades.

It would be well to take greater advantage of Stakhanovite schools where instruction is contributing to significant increases in labor productivity and to increased earnings of the workers. For example, the results obtained at the North Ural bauxite mines through mass instruction in Stakhanovite schools are characteristic.

Percentage of Fulfillment of the Production Norm

	Before Instruction	After Instruction
Miners, 197 workers	118	146
Drillers, 20 workers	105	147
Mechanics, 41 workers	101	128

In one of the plants of the Main Non-ferrous Metal Processing Administration tube-drawing machine operators, before instruction, fulfilled the norm by 94 percent, and after instruction by 125 percent; their earnings increased correspondingly. However, the directors of several enterprises still underestimate the significance of Stakhanovite schools and are not contributing to their growth.

In non-ferrous metal enterprises a number of FZO (TN: Fabrichno-Zavodnoye Obycheniye? Factory-plant Instruction) schools and industrial schools are in operation. We must take measures to spread this network as widely as possible. Directors of enterprises should give all-out aid to the FZO schools and industrial schools by securing visual aids, organizing work-shops, and carrying out production practices which are being taught.

Serious attention should be given the training of specialists with average technical education and to raising the qualifications of skilled practical workmen engaged in technical engineering duties. In the Ministry's technical schools 3663 people were accepted during 1946, and 1342 technicians were graduated.

The average number of students in technical schools at the present time is 3690. Between 1946 and 1950 the output of technicians specializing in non-ferrous metallurgy will total 7250.

During 1945-1946 ,1078 practical workmen were taken off their jobs and requalified. In the fourth quarter of 1946, 1504 practical workmen carried on studies without loss of work. In 1947 we must instruct 3000 people on the job.

For the improvement of work by means of raising the qualifications of skilled practical workmen, it is necessary to carry on minute screening of students and to improve the method of directing the entire system of courses. Up to this time, the work of raising the qualifications of engineer-technicians has lagged. The basic method of raising their qualifications remains the requalifying of personnel on the job in courses organized in the enterprises.

It is also necessary to set up a special institute for raising the qualifications of engineer-technicians with full-time training. At the same time, this institute will conduct courses for raising the qualifications of engineer-technicians

in enterprises.

In order to emplement the 1947 program and the new Five-Year Plan, non-ferrous metal workers will have to overcome many difficulties, but the key to overcoming these difficulties is in the hands of our personnel. Care of the workers, laborers, and engineer-technicians, their material-existence needs, cultural wants, and their ideo-political questions must be the first consideration of the production heads of the non-ferrous metal industry.

In order that our staff personnel may be able to cope with the tasks before them, they must be selected and placed in accordance with their capabilities. It is imperative to guarantee sufficient numbers of experienced directors and engineer-technicians to the mining enterprises of the lead-zinc industry, Ural copper mining enterprises, and the tungsten-molybdenum industry where the number of engineers and technicians actually working in the mines is, at present, insufficient. The problem may be solved by sending there the greatest number of young specialists as well as transferring a number of experienced specialists from the administrative setup. It cannot be considered normal that of the 93 mining engineers working in the Main Ural Copper Administration only 43 actually work in the mines.

In order to clarify the question of proper utilization of specialists, it is necessary to define exactly which functions should be taken over by engineers or technicians. However, this important work is, at present, still in rudimentary form.

In order to carry out the proper arrangement of personnel and selection of directors, it is necessary to instruct the personnel thoroughly in their practical duties every day. The certifying of engineer-technicians and directors, which we have already begun, may plan a large role in this. It should be continued systematically, since at present not more than 25 percent of the total number of engineer-technicians and directors are certified. In order to decide quickly and correctly the question of which production director to appoint, it is imperative to have a well-trained reserve of stall personnel to promote to responsible posts.

Our staff personnel must show initiative in thier work, continually improving the technology and economy of production. To accomplish this, it is necessary that the directors of non-ferrous metals enterprises avoid lapses into conservatism and stagnation in order that they may devote themselves wholeheartedly to the deficiencies in the work.

Economic activities and technical production conferences have played and are playing a large role in the business of educating staff personnel, of developing majority criticism and self-criticism, and of exposing unused internal reserves within the enterprises. Directors of enterprises should conduct these conferences regularly without waiting for outside

reminders.

Production heads of non-ferrous metallurgical industries, should adopt every measure for liquidating the decrease in labor personnel and engineer-technicians. It is not to be considered normal when, for example, at the Mednogorsk copper sulphide plant the number of specialists was decreased by ten, as compared with 1945; at the Ural hard alloy plant, by fourteen, for the same period; and in enterprises of the Main Tungsten Administration in Siberia and the Far East by 50 people.

Directors of these enterprises have not bothered with eliminating the fluctuation of engineer-technical personnel, correctly utilizing them, and creating normal living conditions form them. However, raising the capability qualifications and creating necessary material-existence conditions are only part of the work. Ideo-political education must be indissolubly connected with raising the technical qualifications of our personnel. "The socialist creation speeds up the forward movement of Soviet society, increasing the sources of its strength and power. Therefore, the steady raising of the political and cultural level of the people is the vital need of the Soviet structure." (A.A.Zhdanov, Report at the Triumphal Session of the Moscow Soviet, 6 Nov 1946)

The great strength of the socialist creation, the surmount every obstacle, should be especially inherent in non-ferrous metal workers, who must labor at times under estremely difficult conditions. The great problems facing the Ministry of Non-ferrous Metallurgy in 1947 in the fields of increasing the volume of production, raising labor productivity, and fulfilling the plan for building new factories and restoring old ones may be successfully resolved only if our personnel---workers, skilled workmen, technicians, engineers, and directors---each at his own post, will work as the Bolshevik Party demands and as Comrade Stalin teaches.

We must never forget the words of Comrade Stalin:"the production program is the vital and practical activity of millions of people. The realization of our production program lies with living people---you and I---our will to labor, our preparedness to work in the new way, our decision to fulfill the plan." (I, Stalin, Questions of Leninism)

There is no doubt that the workers in non-ferrous metallurgy, geologists, miners, refiners, metallurgists, are successfully dealing with the problems facing them in the year of peaceful construction.

The 1947 plan and the new Five-Year Plan, as a whole, will be fulfilled and overfulfilled.

Our motherland demands this; Comrade Stalin demands this.

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